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Glossary 
Betterment (avoidance of): UK insurance policies are based on reinstating a building to 
the same condition as it was before the flood damage/loss occurred (indemnity principle). 
Any ‘improvements’ to a customer's home constitute ‘betterment’ of the property and are 
not, therefore, covered by the insurance policy. 
Claims Management (companies): companies that specialise in managing claims 
including putting in place contractors to undertake the necessary drying and repair work 
(damage management companies). They may represent a policyholder in their claim 
independently or be instructed by insurers; may take the form of claims managers, 
independent loss assessors, loss adjusting companies, contractors, or other professionals. 
Damage Management (companies): specialise in the organization and management of 
the stabilization, mitigation and restoration of properties, contents, facilities and assets 
following incident damage (BS12999-2015). 
Loss Adjuster: an independent claims specialist who assesses loss and damage and 
investigates large or complex claims; usually employed by the insurance company. 
Loss Assessor: a company or individual who is employed by the policyholder to negotiate 
on their behalf to progress a claim to resolution.  
Recoverable measures: (Also known as flood repairable approaches, water entry 
strategy, resilient reinstatement, resilient repair or wetproofing). These are defined as 
measures that are designed to limit loss, damage and disruption in the event that water 
enters the building envelope during a flood. 
Reinstatement (flood reinstatement) the process of assessing, drying, replacing and 
repairing a property and contents to bring policyholders back to pre-flood condition. 
Repair (building repair) the building process of repairing existing or replacing stripped out 
building elements after drying and necessary strip-out following flooding. 
Reinstatement/repair (companies): specialise in the post-drying repair of a property. 
Resilient adaptation: implementation/retrofit of property level resilient measures 
(including but not limited to resilient repair).   
Resilient reinstatement: an approach to reinstatement that includes reducing 
unnecessary strip-out and implementation of resilient repair.   
Resilient repair: implementation of resilient measures within the process of flood damage 
repair sometimes known as “build back better”.    
Risk: the probability of harmful consequences or expected losses resulting from a given 
hazard to a given element at danger or peril over a specified time period (Risk is normally 
calculated as Probability × Consequence). 
Risk management: the systematic process of risk assessment, options appraisal and 
implementation of any risk management measures to control or mitigate risk. 
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Secondary Damage: secondary damage is the avoidable damage that occurs after a 
water damage incident that may be caused by lack of prompt action such as removal of 
water or by transfer of water vapour to unaffected parts. Examples of secondary damage 
include increased moisture penetration and the onset of mould/fungal growth, in areas that 
were not originally affected. 
Micro-businesses: those employing fewer than 10 people. 
Small businesses: those employing 10-49 people 
 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: those employing fewer than 250 people. 
 
Soft strip-out (resilient strip-out): removal of wet contents and building fabric is often 
required to prevent secondary damage and facilitate drying. Soft strip-out is an approach 
that seeks to retain and dry materials in situ where possible. 
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Executive Summary 
This Defra research project (FD2706) was concerned with how the professionals and 
organisations involved in the recovery process following a flood incident interact with 
householders and business owners. In particular, the way in which decisions are made 
about reinstatement was examined, as there is a need to improve the understanding of the 
opportunities within the process for encouraging resilient repair. Resilient repair is the 
application of property flood resilience measures during the recovery period so that, should 
there be another flood, the householder or business owner can re-occupy their properties 
more quickly, which has well documented benefits. Installing some measures during 
recovery has also been shown to be more cost effective and potentially less disruptive 
than the retrofitting of measures at other times. 
The project had three elements: a quick scoping review; a series of case studies involving 
in-depth interviews with flooded households, small/micro-businesses and their repair 
networks; and, a series of facilitated group discussions with stakeholders to validate the 
findings of the Quick Scoping Review and case studies. Flow charts of the on-site and off-
site processes and of the decisions involved in the repair of insured properties were 
developed to highlight the main points at which the ‘resilience’ of the reinstatement is 
determined. A list of 55 barriers and facilitators and a further list of 49 suggestions for 
change or wider application of good practice were extracted from the literature and 
interviews. Themes for improvement were developed and a selection of the suggestions 
was further explored in the facilitated group discussions. 
This document summarises all three elements of the project. The detailed findings of the 
Quick Scoping Review are also available in a separate report. Detailed findings from the 
in-depth interviews and workshops are available as appendices to this report. The 
summary of key findings below relates to the whole project. 
Key findings and recommendations 
The project has identified a shift in the thinking about/practice of resilience in recovery 
within some sections of the industry. This thinking places greater emphasis on retaining 
existing resilience and reducing strip-out rather than replacing existing materials with more 
resilient ones. Therefore the term ‘resilient reinstatement’ is used in this report to describe 
the approach that includes the consideration of reduced strip-out and ‘resilient repair’ 
refers to the introduction of more resilient options during the repair phase of reinstatement. 
Evidence suggested that having an overview (shared by all parties) of the whole process 
before strip-out and a shared plan could lead to resilient reinstatement where: i) 
contractors do not strip out fabric that is already resilient; ii) contractors do not spend time 
and energy drying contents and fabric that will later be replaced with more resilient 
alternatives; iii) consideration is given to selecting a reinstatement process that will 
enhance resilience within reasonable levels of cost and disruption. 
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Based on literature, interviews and case studies, the project found that the delivery of 
reinstatement presents many challenges – even before issues of resilience are taken into 
account. This is particularly the case in the aftermath of a large flood event. Despite 
insurers’ and professionals’ efforts, and acknowledged improvements in some areas since 
the 2000 and 2007 floods, the interviews for this project revealed that there are frequent 
delays to reinstatement and that the process of reinstatement is not transparent to 
stakeholders or policyholders. The project also found that the proliferation of different 
approaches to managing reinstatement since the millennium may have added to the 
confusion. Policyholders are often unhappy with the process and feel disempowered and 
disengaged. Professionals are naturally very concerned with the challenges of meeting 
their agreed contractual obligations. 
Many of the recognised barriers to uptake are related to the fact that the challenges within 
the standard reinstatement process prevent the engagement needed to develop a shared 
plan. Therefore measures for simplifying decision making were proposed such as clarity 
around expectations and authorities within the professional supply chain, a clear 
presumption in insurance terms and conditions and contractual frameworks towards 
resilience; increased devolution of authority where appropriate, such as automatic 
implementation of neutral cost resilience or where funds are available from other sources.  
In the same vein of simplifying decision making, given the inherent challenges, where cash 
settlements are agreed,  the authority to decide on resilience rests solely with the 
policyholder. For those who wish to pursue resilient reinstatement, and are able to 
effectively manage the project (directly, or through an appointee), cash settlement can be 
an effective means to reduce administrative challenges. However, in itself, it is not a driver 
of resilient reinstatement and will not encourage uptake for policyholders not already 
predisposed to consider resilient reinstatement particularly if non-specialists are engaged. 
If insurers wish to encourage resilience, and can resolve the process issues, they are in a 
better position to influence uptake through the managed route rather than through cash 
settlement.  
Whether the whole insurance industry (insurers and professionals) wish to actively 
encourage resilience, and what kind of resilience they would encourage is still unclear. 
The project revealed that there are different perspectives and goals even within the same 
company or associated supply chain. While the need for competition and commercial 
differentiation is recognised and acknowledged, other goals for reinstatement are more 
widely shared and clearly understood, and receive more attention from the industry. 
Standardisation across the industry could be encouraged through external influence e.g. 
government regulation or facilitation of self-regulation or agreements. In addition, general 
reinstatement standards (BS12999) and guidance (PCA Code of Practice) could be 
revised to include greater emphasis on resilient repair.  
Streamlining the delivery of resilient repair could also make resilience during recovery 
more acceptable. Identification of established routes to source specialised materials and 
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trades can address many potential delays. There is also need to upskill professionals to 
meet the new expectations.  
Acceptance of resilient reinstatement by policyholders is critical if uptake is to be 
increased. However, as the research supported, the recovery process is stressful and 
discussions of resilience are likely only to be constructive within trusted relationships. 
Therefore streamlining decision making needs to be balanced by improved engagement 
with policyholders’ and better communication of decisions. Development of trust between 
professionals and policyholders enables acceptance of changes that are considered 
standard and understanding of options on which policyholders need to make informed 
choices. The research found evidence to suggest that policyholders relate well to 
companies and individuals that are in meaningful, frequent contact, are able to show 
empathy to the emotional aspects of flooding, and are delivering tangible, practical 
assistance.   
The amount, quality and delivery of communication around resilience needs to increase. 
Insurers and professionals need to recognise the potential for trauma and stress to limit 
the ability of policyholders to base decisions on new information. During reinstatement, the 
concept of resilience should be introduced early and revisited at key points. Messages 
need to be consistent based on a consensus between professionals of the options to be 
discussed and their implications, including a recognition of any emotional aspects of 
suggested changes. Having a shared plan, clear lines of authority and a single informed 
point of contact within the insurance company can facilitate good communication.  
Despite these improvements the potential benefits of resilience may need to be confirmed 
by independent sources before they are trusted. Some policyholders already consult 
trusted advisers (such as insurance brokers and the National Flood Forum) and some may 
welcome the opportunity to consult with independent sources of advice. There is, however, 
currently no clear funded route for this. Suggestions included funding for local authorities 
or charities, government guidance and signposting to existing independent guidance, 
industry-wide standards and codes of practice. 
The project was focussed on the recovery process rather than broader questions about 
uptake of property flood resilience (such as awareness, funding or effectiveness) that have 
been covered by previous research. The project also sought to pinpoint issues specific to 
building reinstatement while recognising that effective flood recovery includes many more 
human, social and financial aspects. During the research suggestions were often raised 
that covered broader issues. These are generally captured in the detailed reports but two 
aspects are highlighted here: i) plans for resilient reinstatement are ideally formed before 
an event occurs both within the industry and by policyholders and therefore 
communication about resilience is needed at the point of policy purchase; ii) flood resilient 
repair can be included during any reinstatement process, not just after a flooding, if a 
known flood risk exists. Inclusion of guidance on flood resilience in reinstatement 
standards and codes of practice can, therefore, be generic and widely applicable. 
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1. Background 
Despite investment in flood risk management assets, both in the past and planned for the 
future, households and small/micro-business premises remain at residual risk of flooding. 
The financial cost of flooding is borne by a variety of stakeholders including direct insurers, 
reinsurers (including Flood Re) together with households and businesses themselves. Just 
as important, however, are the non-financial costs, such as the distress and disruption 
caused, the ensuing mental health costs that affect society and the indirect impacts on 
national and local economies. Delays in recovering from flooding also result in costs to 
local authorities, for example where relief from paying council tax is granted. Recovery can 
be facilitated by the prevention, or reduction, in physical damage that can be achieved 
through property flood resilience (PFR). PFR includes measures to keep water out of the 
property (resistance, or water exclusion) and measures to prevent damage once water has 
entered the building (resilience, recoverability or repairable measures). The adoption of 
PFR can reduce the financial and non-financial impacts of flooding, by enabling 
householders and businesses to re-occupy their properties more rapidly. Despite the 
provision of grant funding removing some of the financial constraints, take up of resilient 
reinstatement still appears low.  
It has been demonstrated that it is more cost beneficial and less disruptive to make 
internal adaptation in the aftermath of flooding when it is part of recovery work (Royal 
Haskoning, 2012; Joseph, 2014). Recent research for Defra (FD2682) (Lamond et al., 
2017) confirmed these findings, and revealed that resilient reinstatement could also be 
undertaken piecemeal. Low cost resilient reinstatement (as opposed to the more 
expensive packages previously considered) was found to pay back the initial costs after a 
single subsequent flood event, in some cases.  
Lamond et al. (2017) also developed a series of innovative practices to assist 
professionals and practitioners to generate more opportunities to install repairable 
measures (for example, a checklist for use by loss adjusters/building surveyors). Trialling 
of these innovations revealed some operational constraints, relating to current insurance 
reinstatement practices that form barriers to the uptake of resilient reinstatement. These 
included: funding under the principle of ‘avoidance of betterment’; timing issues (such as 
insurers’ reluctance to risk works perceived as delaying completion); the short available 
time window for making recommendations and for policyholders to make choices; the lack 
of motivation for households and small/micro-businesses to agree to changes that may 
delay reoccupation; and lack of knowledge and experience in resilient reinstatement within 
the general reinstatement industry. 
These factors are in addition to well-recognised barriers such as denial of risk, abrogation 
of responsibility by owners, and homeowner reluctance to consider reinstatement that 
does not replicate the way their homes looked prior to the flood. The latter issue is not 
simply a matter of aesthetics, but can be an attempt to reassert control after the perceived 
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‘despoiling’ of an intimate, identity-laden space. By recognising that some of these 
financial and emotional factors are relatively fixed constraints that will take time to change, 
this project sought to improve the delivery of resilient reinstatement to ensure it is more 
easily understood and more accessible to householders and small/micro-businesses.  
By understanding how to remove logistical and process barriers that currently act to 
entrench attitudes, and deter otherwise willing parties from undertaking resilient 
reinstatement, the aim was to discover ways to make the process more straightforward, 
more consistent and more ’normal’. In the short term, this is expected to increase uptake 
(Harries, 2008) which in itself will help to erode some of the more intractable barriers via 
improved experience with resilient reinstatement.  
The long term goal of this research, therefore, is to understand how to increase the take-
up of resilient measures and materials by householders and small/micro-businesses 
during the recovery period. This would help to ensure that more properties are adapted to 
minimise the damage and disruption following flooding. 
Project aims 
The research aims were to:  
 Understand the standard process of recovery for insurers, professionals,  
householders and small/micro-businesses and how this could be made more 
inclusive of resilient repair following a major flooding incident; 
 Examine ways in which the delivery of resilient repair could be improved to ensure it 
is more easily understood and more consistently accessible to householders and 
small/micro-businesses across England;  
 Identify opportunities for key actors (Government, insurers and professionals) to 
ensure resilient repair can be included in the repair and reinstatement work that 
takes place.  
 
The research also sought to answer the following research questions that support the 
research aims: 
1. What are the facilitators and barriers to the take-up of resilient repair in high flood 
risk areas, especially during and after major flooding incidents when local resources 
are stretched? 
 
2. What approaches by those who commission work (including the Government, 
councils, builders, insurers and surveying industry) would ensure that professionals 
are better prepared to deliver resilient repair following major flooding incidents?  
 
3. How does the reinstatement process currently work following a flooding incident? 
How can competing demands from insurers and the wider goal of delivering resilient 
repairs be harmonised at the professional level?  
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4. What approaches could be taken to make the implementation of resilient measures 
more effective in the recovery process following flooding incidents? 
 
5. How do householders approach the ‘project management’ of the repair process, 
and how could awareness and knowledge about resilience be better supported in 
this process? 
 
The scope of the project covers households and small/micro-businesses (focusing on 
those that occupy premises of a similar construction type to domestic property). The 
process of flood recovery is known to be complex, as it involves multiple professional 
stakeholders who interact directly with households and businesses (Soetanto, 2008; 
Samwinga, 2009; H M Govt et al., 2010). To identify realistic opportunities for change, the 
project needed to understand the planned process (as seen through the eyes of insurance 
companies and administrators), and the lived process (as seen through the eyes of 
flooded households and small/micro-businesses, as well as the property professionals 
assisting them in recovery) (Woodhead, 2012). 
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2. Description of approach 
The aims of this project required an approach that delivered a holistic understanding of the 
recovery process informed by the experience of households, small/micro-businesses and 
the reinstatement professions. First, a broad overview of the processes was constructed; 
second, an in-depth understanding of some of the potential challenges to resilient 
reinstatement was gained; finally opportunities to improve uptake of resilient repair during 
the recovery process were identified and validated. The approach was delivered through 
three data collections phases: 
1. A Quick Scoping Review of the challenges and opportunities that included academic 
and policy literature and consultation with industry experts;  
2. ‘360-style’ case-studies, involving interviews with households, small/micro-businesses 
and the reinstatement professionals who had been involved with their recovery;  
3. Facilitated group discussions with experts from major stakeholder groups to explore the 
validity of interim findings and suggested opportunities for improving the reinstatement 
process. 
 
The ‘Quick Scoping Review’ which formed the initial phase of this project is available as a 
separate report1. 
 
2.1 Quick Scoping Review  
The Quick Scoping Review sought to understand the available evidence about the process 
of resilient reinstatement and the associated facilitators and barriers. The Quick Scoping 
Review was carried out through an initial scoping of literature, combined with a series of 
interviews with experts in the claims process. This strategy combined published research 
with current practice. It was particularly important in this case because it is recognised that 
the evolution of the industry claims process has been driven by major flooding over the 
period 2014-2018 and the majority of published research findings precede this. (Full 
details of the protocol and search strategy are to be found in the Quick Scoping Review 
report1). 
2.1.1 Primary question for the Quick Scoping Review 
The primary question for the Quick Scoping Review, based upon the need to gather 
evidence to support the ‘broad overview’ referred to above was: 
                                            
1 Lamond, J. and C. Rose (2018). Supporting the uptake of resilient reinstatement during the recovery process (FD2706): 
Quick Scoping Review. London, Defra.  
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“What do we know about facilitators and barriers to resilient repair during 
the recovery process of households and small/micro-businesses following 
major flooding?” 
2.1.2 Supplementary research questions  
The supplementary research questions for the Quick Scoping Review were developed 
from the project research questions, in order to focus the search upon the relevant 
evidence from all the sources to be interrogated. The full text sources accessed (147 in all) 
were scored for relevance against these supplementary questions (Table 1) which 
hereafter will be referred to as SRQ1-6. 
Table 1 - Supplementary research questions 
SR NUMBER SUPPLEMENTARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
SRQ1 What processes and project management arrangements characterise 
existing approaches to reinstatement? 
SRQ2 
 
How do these processes and project management arrangements 
restrict or encourage resilient repair? 
SRQ3 How is/can resilient repair be funded/resourced? 
SRQ4 What are the criteria for successful reinstatement from the perspective 
of different stakeholders? 
SRQ5 What are the challenges faced by households and small/micro-
businesses in project-managing the process of resilient repair and 
how can they be addressed? 
SRQ6 What hampers the engagement of professionals with resilient repair 
and how can these issues be addressed? 
 
2.1.3 Expert Interviews 
Fourteen expert interviews were undertaken to capture additional evidence on the process 
of recovery from their perspectives as experts involved in supporting, overseeing and 
advising on recovery. Five target groups were identified, namely: insurance company 
representatives; loss adjusting professionals; insurance brokers; cleaning and drying 
contractors; and reinstatement contractors. Individuals were identified through existing 
contacts and internet searching and contacted through email, telephone and ‘LinkedIn’ 
messaging, before being formally invited to participate using a project information sheet, 
invitation letter and consent form in concordance with UWE ethics protocols2. 
Respondents were asked to recommend further contacts for interview. Semi–structured 
interviews were also employed to collect qualitative data under the themes of role and 
                                            
2 UWE REC REF No:  FET.17.11.014. 
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experience, the process of reinstatement, experience with resilient reinstatement and 
barriers and opportunities for resilient reinstatement.  
Content analysis of the literature and interviews was undertaken under the research 
questions and data was extracted on barriers, facilitators and suggested improvements. 
Following completion of the Quick Scoping Review, the research moved into the next 
phase, which is discussed in the following section. 
 
2.2 ‘360-style’ case-studies 
This case-study method was chosen to gain insight into the process of reinstatement from 
the point of view of those most closely involved in it. 
Objectives 
a. Understand the process of reinstatement as it is experienced by the various actors 
involved with individual properties 
b. Learn about these actors’ views of, and experiences of, resilient reinstatement 
c. Understand how the relationships between these actors influence the use of 
resilience within the reinstatement process 
Approach 
a. Interview a diverse range of owners/tenants of flooded homes and owners/tenants of 
flooded business premises  
b. As far as possible, interview those professionals that might have influenced the use 
of resilient methods/materials during the reinstatement of these properties 
2.2.1 Selection of geographical areas  
The sampling began with the identification of parts of England where flooding had 
occurred during the three previous years. Five different areas of England were selected, 
covering a range of type of flood experiences. These included one or more areas in which 
there had been flooding of a substantial number of small/micro-businesses, and one in 
which the most recent flood event had not been eligible for central government flood 
resilience/ protection grants. To protect confidentiality and anonymity, the details provided 
in this report are kept to a minimum.  
2.2.2 Recruitment 
The research team used a variety of methods to recruit domestic and small/micro-business 
policyholders including direct mailing (through loss adjusters) and internet searches, and 
local government reports to identify flooded businesses and homes. Some contacts were 
asked to recommend others that had flooded and would make potential participants. 
In each of the interviews with owners/tenants of flooded properties, participants were 
asked to name the people/companies (hereafter, ‘professionals’) involved in the 
reinstatement of their home/business and to give written permission for them to discuss 
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their specific case with the research team. Professionals were only approached if 
interviewees gave their permission and if there was no evidence of animosity between 
parties. Professionals were approached by telephone/email. This resulted in 6 ‘360-style’ 
case studies and 11 single interview case studies. During the recruitment process the 
opportunity arose to include a case study based on a building occupied by Defra in Carlisle 
and restored to be resilient. This case study is included in Appendix 6. A ‘360-style’ 
process was used to gather information in the case study.  As Crown buildings are not 
insured, however, the learnings were not included in the main findings of this report.  
2.2.3 Sample 
Ten flooded households and seven flooded business owners were interviewed, with the 
characteristics shown in Tables 2 and 3 below. For further details, see Appendix 1. 
Table 2: Characteristics of households interviewed (n=10) 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
NUMBER 
SOME RESILIENT REPAIR 
 
5 
GOVT GRANT AVAILABLE 
 
7 
TENURE Owner occupiers 10 
Tenants 0 
Table 3: Characteristics of businesses interviewed (n=7) 
CHARACTERISTIC 
 
NUMBER 
SOME RESILIENT REPAIR 
 
3 
GOVT GRANT AVAILABLE 
 
6 
BUSINESS CATEGORY3 Retail/ whole-sale 2 
Accommodation & food 1 
Insurance & finance 1 
Arts, Entertainment & 
Recreation 
2 
Other services 1 
TENURE Owner occupiers 3 
Tenants 4 
The nine professional interviewees comprised an architectural technician, an insurance 
broker, two independent builders, the manager of a restoration franchise, the landlord of a 
business premises, two surveyors and a loss adjuster. These were associated with three 
flooded businesses and three flooded households.  
                                            
3 See the European Union’s NACE Rev-2: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nomenclatures/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_NOM_DTL&StrNom=NACE_REV2&StrLanguageCode=E
N 
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2.2.4 Data collection 
Participants were interviewed for between 30 and 75 minutes – flooded businesses and 
householders mostly in person; professionals exclusively by telephone. Interviews were 
semi-structured.  All interviews were audio-recorded and professionally transcribed. 
2.2.5 Analysis of case study data and development of themes 
Following analysis, the research team developed ‘themes for improvement’ initially using 
the lists of suggestions for change, as well as the facilitators and barriers that had been 
identified by the Quick Scoping Review (see Appendices 2 and 3). These themes were 
further refined using the findings from the case studies, which also provided 
supplementary themes. Specific suggestions for improvement or further roll-out were 
categorised against the themes. To illustrate some of the themes for discussion at the 
focus group discussion, three ‘hybrid’ case studies were created to depict key features of 
the narratives revealed in the interviews (see Appendix 5). Each hybrid case study is an 
amalgam of a number of different cases reported in the interviews. Each reports without 
judgement the views and recollections of professionals, tenants and property owners that 
were interviewed. 
2.3 Facilitated group discussion validation 
The facilitated group discussions specifically addressed Research Question 4 of the 
overall research project:  
What approaches could be taken to make the implementation of resilient 
measures more effective in the recovery process following flooding 
incidents? 
The purpose of the Facilitated Group Discussions was to validate findings from interviews 
and the Quick Scoping Review. A mapping process and “stress testing” of interim findings 
was undertaken with key experts in a series of three events. The participants were chosen 
to cover a range of professions relevant to resilient recovery and were drawn from 
contacts within the project team and the Defra project board. These discussions engaged 
with 16 professionals from the insurance, damage management and surveying industries 
as well as representatives from the private, public, academic and third sectors. Within 
each discussion, between four and eight professionals from a mixture of backgrounds 
discussed the interim findings.  
All participants who attended the Facilitated Group Discussions were asked to sign a 
consent form4 confirming their informed participation. All information provided in the 
Facilitated Group Discussions was treated as confidential. Any comments made during the 
discussion are presented anonymously in the reporting which follows.  
                                            
4 The consent form had received ethics approval from the University of West of England, Bristol, as was the methodology and data 
storage arrangements. 
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The Facilitated Group Discussions were structured into four activities, with each activity 
consisting of a presentation followed by a structured discussion. 
2.3.1 Facilitated group discussion process  
Activity 1 of the Facilitated Group Discussion commenced with a presentation of the 
interim findings of the research. Participants were given the hybrid case studies from the 
‘360-style’ interviews. Working in two groups, participants reviewed the case study with the 
aim of identifying any experiences or aspects mentioned that were unfamiliar to them, or 
surprised them. They were then asked to consider key changes that would have made a 
difference. 
In Activity 2 participants were shown a revised process plan, including decision points of 
the reinstatement process and a description of the different actors involved derived from 
the Quick Scoping Review and refined by data from the professional interviews. There 
followed a discussion of the process, with any additional information felt to be relevant 
being added to the process chart by means of post-it notes.  
Activity 3 involved ‘stress testing’ both the themes derived from the evidence. Participants 
were asked to assess whether the themes were sensible and as they would have 
expected. They were then asked to rank the themes in order of importance to the overall 
process, as well as highlighting any modifications they felt were needed. In the fourth and 
final activity participants were presented with a selection of suggestions that could 
encourage resilient reinstatement in the recovery process. Working in two groups, they 
were asked to reflect on how realistic the suggestions were, where they would fit within the 
process, and which professionals would need to make changes if these were to be taken 
up. Participants were also asked if they felt any suggestions were ‘easy wins’ or key 
priorities to pursue.  
The detailed structuring of these sessions varied according to the participants who 
attended (for example, their professional backgrounds and familiarity with the research 
project). In activities, half of the project team acted as facilitators, and half as note-takers. 
Activities were recorded by note-taking from several members of the project team, and 
audio recordings were collected of all plenary and group sessions.  
2.3.2 Approach to analysis  
Facilitated group discussion notes were compiled into a Word document, and the 
associated recordings into a digital audio folder. The notes were analysed inductively to 
investigate emergent themes, through use of coding to gather information about recurrent 
themes. Audio recording was subsequently used to sense-check the coding and emergent 
themes from the analysis.   
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3 Findings 
Findings are presented below by method under the principal research methods and then 
summarised by emergent theme. The findings from the Quick Scoping Review presented 
are the conclusion from the Quick Scoping Review report5 and therefore include some 
recommended actions.  
3.1 Findings from Quick Scoping Review 
A list of 55 barriers and facilitators and a further list of 49 suggestions for change or wider 
application of good practice were extracted from the literature and interviews. These are 
listed in the Quick Scoping Review report. Findings from the Quick Scoping Review are 
presented in relation to the supplementary research questions (as listed in Section 2.1.2 
above). 
3.1.1 SRQ 1 & 2: What processes and project management 
arrangements characterise existing approaches to 
reinstatement? How do these processes and project 
management arrangements restrict or encourage resilient 
repair? 
Flood reinstatement, as currently experienced, emerges as a set of physical processes 
that in the main need to be carried out sequentially (for example, repair work cannot 
normally be commenced until the property has been assessed as being sufficiently dry). 
These physical processes depend upon assessments, decisions and project management 
tasks, whose timing and sequencing is slightly more flexible. For example, decisions 
regarding final finishes in a property may be made at any point in time, provided this 
precedes actual implementation.  
Processes 
The Quick Scoping Review revealed that the five ‘post event phases of recovery’ (First 
Notification of loss and stabilisation; cleaning and stripping out; drying and 
decontamination; repair and reoccupation) are not, in practice, necessarily distinct and 
sequential. For example, an inventory of contents can be taken before or after the contents 
are removed from the building. Similarly, payments for alternative accommodation can be 
delayed, and loss assessment may take place after a decision on drying methods has 
been made. Project management arrangements, including associated decisions and 
changes to the order of various assessments and decision points can often cause these 
‘phases’ to overlap significantly. 
                                            
5 Lamond, J. and C. Rose (2018). Supporting the uptake of resilient reinstatement during the recovery process (FD2706): 
Quick Scoping Review. London, Defra.  
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Each phase does, however, have physical processes associated with it that should 
precede the next phase (if they occur). The simplified and idealised process diagram 
(Figure 1) introduces the idea of several parallel streams of processes with time flowing 
vertically down the figure. The activities in rows 1- 4 restrict the actions in the on-site 
critical path (row 5, highlighted in orange) such that the plans (row 3) should be in place 
before the implementation on site. The plans are (ideally) based on assessments that 
precede them but sequencing changes (within certain limitations) are possible on the 
parallel process flows.  
Moving from top to bottom on Figure 1, assessments should occur before the plans on the 
same time step are prepared. The procurement and on-site physical process occur after 
the plan, and this is shown on Figure 1 as being on the same or following time step. The 
on-site critical path is largely sequential, although the stabilisation and cleaning/strip-out 
phases may overlap. The amount of strip-out may also be negligible, depending upon the 
nature of the materials already in place within the property. The blanks in the on-site 
critical path represent potential delays or pauses between activities. These may be 
lengthy, either due to non-availability of contractors, procurement delays or protracted 
discussions around plans.  
It is recognised that this idealised flow is challenging to achieve in practice and that the 
organisations involved in the different activities will vary. It does, however, allow the 
identification of decision points where choices about resilience are made, whether actively 
or by default. 
In terms of facilitating or inhibiting resilient reinstatement, there are four planning stages 
that can impact upon the potential to add resilience to a property, which are: 1) the strip-
out; 2) drying; 3) repair; and 4) choosing fixtures planning stages (row 3). The ‘repair plan’ 
(also known as the ‘repair schedule’) usually incorporates stages 3 and 4 and is the most 
significant decision point, as it specifies the materials that are to be used. This schedule 
may be prepared at any time before active repair begins, which in turn means that the 
latest possible point at which the decisions regarding resilience can be taken occurs after 
drying and before repair.  
Resilient reinstatement can, however, include the retention of appropriate existing 
materials wherever possible. A critical finding to the understanding of resilience during 
recovery is the increased emphasis on resilient reinstatement as a concept that 
incorporates less strip-out (leaving resilient materials in place, sometimes called ‘resilient’ 
or ‘soft’ strip-out) and resilient repair (replacing stripped out materials with more 
recoverable ones and introducing avoidance strategies). 
Decisions about resilience, therefore, need to be made before strip-out commences. 
Notwithstanding that, typically there will be some assessments and further discovery that 
occur during the strip-out and drying processes that can inform the final decision on repair.  
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Figure 1: The reinstatement process – high level process, including critical path.  
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The decision pathways taken during the recovery process are represented in Error! 
Reference source not found.. This acknowledges that a level of resilience is always 
present (existing resilience), as decisions to retain materials can maintain existing 
resilience, while decisions regarding strip-out and reinstatement can variously result in 
reduced, maintained or enhanced resilience. Materials, particularly fittings and contents, 
may be stripped out temporarily and then recovered (on or off site), while other materials 
may be discarded and replaced with resilient choices.  
Figure 2: Process diagram showing key decision points 
Project management  
The professional roles that have involvement in the process are shown in Error! 
Reference source not found.. The Quick Scoping Review found that company 
boundaries are not fixed around roles. For example, a surveyor tasked with overseeing the 
repair process may work for an insurer directly, or the policyholder, a loss adjuster, a 
reinstatement company, a building contracting company or a broker. The review identified 
a large number of different types of company from a limited number of interviews, but there 
may potentially be others. It was concluded that it is not possible to represent all the 
different potential pathways through the recovery process at this time.  
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In many cases, the complexity in the number and range of professionals involved 
represents a potentially overwhelming situation for a policyholder. Whether or not they are 
managing the process, the policyholder may have to interact with a large number of 
individuals representing different companies. This confusion can be exacerbated when 
roles and responsibilities in the overall process vary between neighbours and between 
claims.  
 
Figure 3: Key roles/stakeholders engaged during the process of reinstatement 
The Quick Scoping Review concluded that given that decisions during the initial phases 
can influence the opportunity to maximise resilience, the judgement should be made as 
early in the process as possible. Therefore, it is important that the coordination between 
the different professionals starts early, as recent developments in claims processes can 
now see reinstatement and drying companies being first on the scene. Lack of 
communication between companies, fragmentation within the supply chain, and between 
individuals in different operational divisions of a single company can also create difficulties. 
Given these facts, our conclusion is that clear contractual terms incentivizing resilience 
and good communications are essential. 
The Quick Scoping Review suggested, therefore, that in order to maximise the potential for 
resilient reinstatement, project management and oversight should be provided by the 
same person, or team, across the three critical phases (cleaning and stripping out; drying 
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and decontamination; and repair). This team/person would need to have appropriate 
knowledge and experience of resilient reinstatement. Project management arrangements 
that currently hand oversight from one professional to another would, therefore, need to be 
modified to incorporate checks and feedback loops. Oversight should also be independent, 
in the sense of choosing the optimal strategy for both the building and policyholder. Such a 
strategy may affect the balance of work to be undertaken by different contractors, but a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approach does not facilitate the uptake of resilient reinstatement.   
This would work differently for each of the four models of oversight which are common for 
the three critical phases, namely a loss adjuster, a surveyor, a damage management 
specialist or a policyholder (residential or small/micro-business). When a loss adjuster or 
surveyor is involved from the start of the reinstatement process, rather than being brought 
in later, there is an increased chance of achieving the coordination required. If a damage 
management company is charged with oversight they would ideally be appointed at the 
start of reinstatement. There is scope for insurers to increase control over the process by 
bringing such expertise ‘in-house’ to encourage resilient reinstatement (if they wish to do 
so). Individual policyholders who are motivated towards resilient reinstatement can be in a 
very strong position to oversee the process, provided they can access the relevant 
advisors (whether by taking on the project management role, or where a cash settlement 
can be agreed).  
3.1.2 SRQ 3 & 4: How is/can resilient repair be 
funded/resourced? What are the criteria for successful 
reinstatement from the perspective of different 
stakeholders? 
Cost, time and quality are benchmarks for construction in general and are also important 
for building repair. Cost and time are the dominant themes that recur in the literature and 
in the interviews (Lamond et al., 2016), whereas quality is less talked about except in 
reference to the difficulties in achieving good quality and the shortage of good contractors. 
No performance indicators were mentioned by the interviewees relating to quality.  
The Quick Scoping Review suggested that claims cost control is reflected in contractual 
arrangements with the insured customer and the supply chain. Controlling cost often 
translates into limited appetite to support resilient reinstatement if it costs more to 
implement. However, not all resilient reinstatement is more costly to implement. 
The alternative thinking suggests that by employing resilient reinstatement insurers should 
be able to save money by reducing the amount of strip-out. This view of resilient 
reinstatement has the potential to increase uptake of some forms of resilience while 
potentially, by reducing the need for repair, lowering the chance that the most effective 
measures are installed.  
Resilient repair, in some areas, has been funded from government grants following major 
floods in 2013/14 and 2015/16. There is also the potential for grants to be made available 
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by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as charities. As insurers are currently 
constrained by the principle of ‘no betterment’ the funding available for resilience through 
such routes is likely to exceed that available from insurance claims, if these are to remain 
cost-neutral. The cost of administering grant schemes (including the necessary 
professional survey costs) can, however, reduce the amount available to spend on 
measures themselves. Innovative local schemes have also sought to set up recovery 
funds that could be used for resilience. Domestic, and small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME), policyholders (including micro-businesses) can also contribute to the cost of 
resilient repair themselves. All SME’s are now eligible for a scheme that prices policies to 
reflect any risk reduction measures adopted (British Insurance Brokers' Association, 2018). 
This does not reduce the cost of the measures themselves, but does provide a long-term 
benefit in reduced premiums/excesses. 
The time taken to repair a property is also perceived as a major barrier to resilient repair 
by all stakeholders, as insurance companies seek to minimise the time that people are out 
of their homes or businesses following a flood. There is currently a perception, in some 
sectors of the business, that carrying out resilient repair will delay reinstatement, and thus 
re-occupation, of the property. There have also been claims that resilient properties take 
longer to dry out following a flood. The Quick Scoping Review showed very little evidence 
to generalise one way or another on the additional length of time it takes to install 
resilience, or on the actual changes to the drying times due to changes in building fabric. 
Existing case studies provide contradictory evidence, but this is probably due to variety of 
approaches taken in making the properties resilient in the examples (Lamond et al., 2016). 
The views of insured policyholders have long been represented in the literature as 
prioritising the minimisation of time and avoidance of disruption during the current 
reinstatement over any future risk reduction (Lamond et al., 2017). 
Aesthetics and perceived quality are also important criteria that can limit the desire to 
accept resilient reinstatement (for example, Harries, 2010). Literature also indicates a 
need for policyholders to be consulted. Some policyholders desire to feel in charge of the 
process, while others would rather leave it to the experts. Businesses regard the speed of 
recovery as the most important aspect (for example, Wedawatta and Ingirige, 2012). 
Examples of practices for higher net worth customers and businesses suggest that low 
profit margins may hamper insurers’ potential to act on flood resilience. It has been 
suggested that insurers might consider offering enhanced ‘claims handling packages’ that 
improve customer outcomes (including speed of reinstatement and enhanced resilience) to 
those customers willing and able to pay for such a service.  
To summarise, as the literature shows, where appropriate resilience measures have been 
installed on a previous occasion then, when another flood occurs, many common goals 
could be achieved, particularly reduced loss and the rapid re-occupation of homes and 
business premises (Crichton, 2006; Pitt, 2008; Samwinga, 2009; Woodhead, 2012; 
Bhattacharya-Mis and Lamond, 2014). Resilient reinstatement should logically, therefore, 
be a desirable step for the insurance industry and property owners alike. However, pursuit 
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of rapid reoccupation after each individual event via alternative strategies may prevent the 
installation of resilient measures which would reduce average loss and disruption in the 
longer term. Therefore, an explicit goal to increase resilient reinstatement may be needed 
to drive change. 
3.1.3 SRQ 5 & 6: What are the challenges faced by households 
and small/micro-businesses in project managing the 
process of resilient repair and how can they be addressed? 
What hampers the engagement of professionals with 
resilient repair and how can these issues be addressed? 
Households and small/micro-business owners are not generally well equipped to project-
manage construction works due to a lack of experience. In the aftermath of a flood and 
alongside their normal lifestyle and commitments, it will normally put strain on them to do 
so. They are unlikely in these circumstances to engage with resilient repair unless highly 
motivated. Once motivated, the lack of clear guidance and availability of well qualified 
professionals is a further deterrent. Once a policyholder has taken ownership of a claim, 
they may be unable to identify and engage specialists with expertise in reinstatement, and 
instead employ a (known) local contractor who may be less knowledgeable, but perceived 
as capable of performing work to a high standard (Fernández-Bilbao and Twigger-Ross, 
2009; Samwinga, 2009; Whittle et al., 2010). 
Professionals in the supply chain lack incentives to engage with resilience (Whittle et al., 
2010; Lamond et al., 2017). They are experts in the processes they currently employ and 
change will incur training costs, a potential risk of reduced quality, perception of poor 
customer service or even negligence claims. Fragmentation of the chain exacerbates 
these issues as there is the risk of damaging professional relationships with other 
suppliers, damaging reputation and reducing profitability.  
Although there have been some initiatives to increase uptake of resilience (such as limited 
government grants) these cannot be relied upon as sources of future funding. The 
individuals and companies involved in the industry require a consistent ‘direction of travel’ 
and this has resulted in some supply chain professionals calling for the insurance industry 
(Flood Re, ABI and insurers) to provide that sense of direction. Insurers can also see the 
benefit in a concerted and consistent industry stance. 
3.1.4 Summary  
The Quick Scoping Review identified a shift in the thinking and practice of resilience in 
recovery within some sections of the industry towards a greater emphasis on retaining 
existing resilience and reducing strip-out rather replacing existing materials with more 
resilient ones. It also identified the main points at which the ‘resilience’ of the reinstatement 
is determined and processes where additional resilience can be incorporated. Decisions at 
the strip-out phase can lead to the retention of existing resilience, whereas decisions at the 
repair phase are most influential in introducing additional resilience.  
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This highlighted the importance of having an overview of the process before strip-out 
begins and a shared plan. Such an overview helps ensure that the decisions are 
compatible and that: i) contractors do not strip out fabric that is already resilient; ii) 
contractors do not spend time and energy drying contents and fabric that will later be 
replaced with more resilient alternatives; iii) consideration is given to different options in 
order to select a reinstatement process that will enhance resilience within reasonable 
levels of cost and disruption. 
The Quick Scoping Review also revealed the lack of clarity and guidance in the 
expectations and processes with regard to resilient reinstatement between insurers and 
their professional supply chain. This was found to be a major barrier to improving uptake 
because it complicates the process of decision making and makes the process of resilient 
reinstatement appear as an extra administrative and practical burden on an already 
complex process. Many of the attitudinal barriers and other capacity issues stem from, or 
are exacerbated by, this lack of clarity.  
3.2 Findings from the case study interviews 
The interviews with flooded households/businesses and the professionals involved in the 
reinstatement of their buildings revealed a number of useful insights into the barriers to 
resilient reinstatement. These are presented here.  A full and detailed account is provided 
in Appendix 1 to this report.  
3.2.1 ‘360-style’ case studies 
To illustrate some of the themes that emerged from the case study interviews, a summary 
is provided here of four of the six ‘360-style’ case studies conducted in this part of the 
study. Each case study summary reports without judgement the views and recollections of 
the professionals, tenants and property owners that were interviewed. Pseudonyms are 
used for all tenants and property owners and words in quotation marks are taken directly 
from the transcripts of the interviews. 
Case Study 1 shows how differently professionals and policyholders can view the 
relationship that they have with each other: when the policyholder sees himself as having 
to be “pushy” in order to compensate for lax professionals, this is seen as ideal by the 
professionals, who view the policyholder as “low maintenance”. Case Study 1 also shows 
how responsibility for resilience can fall between the cracks in the reinstatement system, 
with the loss adjuster seeing it as the surveyor’s responsibility and the surveyor having too 
little contact with the policyholder to be able to persuade them of its value.  
Two of the case studies reveal the extent of the disagreements between professionals on 
issues of resilience. This is shown in disputes about the use of K116 (Case Study 1), over 
                                            
6
K11 is a generic term for salt resistant cementitious tanking compounds used for the protection of structures against water from the 
ground and structures which may potentially be subject to hydrostatic pressure  
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how to deal with an under-floor void (Case Study 1) and over when it is necessary to strip 
out flood-affected plaster (Case Study 2). 
Case Study 2 also reveals the difficulties experienced when interviewing different actors to 
ascertain the barriers to resilient reinstatement. The two interviewees provide different 
explanations for not installing a resilient kitchen, making it hard to establish what the true 
cause was. While Dave reported that he had decided it was “unnecessary”, the surveyor 
implied that it would have been beneficial but that he had advised against it for reasons 
related to the process of reinstatement. Case Study 3 shows some of the difficulties 
caused when the business using a building is not also the policyholder for the building 
insurance. In such cases, the power to implement resilient reinstatement is held by a party 
that has less motivation to do so (the landlord) and the party with the greatest motivation to 
implement resilience is powerless to put this into practice. This, the case study suggests, 
can lead to blame-shifting, passivity and some animosity between the parties. 
Case Study 4 illustrates how cash settlement and the existence of a network of trusted 
professionals can facilitate the incorporation of resilience into the reinstatement process.  
Case Study 1 
Case Study 1 was a mid-terrace 2-storey house occupied by a single older woman, whose 
nearby son dealt with the reinstatement process. The house was given a new kitchen, and 
floorboards, joists, plaster and wallpaper were renewed throughout the ground floor. Flood 
resilience was enhanced by using K11 on the walls, raising sockets and dropping socket 
feeds from the ceiling instead of taking them up from the floor. The policyholder was out of 
her house for eleven months. 
  
Figure 4 – interviews conducted for Case Study 1 – a householder case study 
The builder said that he was able 
to make a profit from strip-out, but 
that for the reinstatement process 
itself high levels of “bureaucracy, 
negotiation, hassle and poor 
communication” made profit 
margins too slender to be worth 
pursuing. 
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Four people were interviewed for this case study: the policyholder’s son, Clive, the loss 
adjuster, the surveyor and the building contractor. Clive, who was described as “low 
maintenance” and “switched on” by the loss adjuster, reported that he had to “push” to get 
his mother’s home put back in under a year.    
The loss adjuster adhered to the principle of no (financial) betterment but was willing to 
facilitate resilience by moving money around. However, he did not feel sufficiently informed 
to promote the resilience adaptations himself, this being, he said, the surveyor’s 
responsibility. He also did not seem to consider surveyors as independent representatives 
of the policyholder, but rather as “colleagues” with “the same aim”.  
The surveyor was only allocated to this case three months after the flood and, because he 
had to travel a long distance, was only able to visit every four weeks. His late arrival and 
infrequent visits, he argued, made it harder for him to provide Clive with a “responsive 
service”; this may explain why Clive considered him obstructive. For example, his delayed 
arrival and inability to visit more frequently prompted him to try to agree the specification of 
works at an earlier stage than he would otherwise have done, and before the policyholder 
had been able to reflect on the issue of resilience. The infrequency of his visits also made 
it harder to gain Clive’s trust, and his perception that policyholders generally placed little 
reliance on surveyors’ expertise probably exacerbated this difficulty. The surveyor said he 
tries to avoid situations in which policyholders pay for additional spend on reinstatement. 
He gave two reasons for this: that builders under contract to insurance companies tend to 
charge more than the going rate for such work, and that giving resilience work to a 
different builder causes too many disputes about responsibility and accountability. He 
argued that in the case of Clive’s mother, nothing could have been done in any case to 
make the house more resilient.  
The builder appeared to agree that nothing much could have been done to improve 
resilience.  A local authority grant paid him to install K11, but he felt its effectiveness might 
be compromised when the plaster on top of it had to be removed after the next flood. He 
was not keen on doing insurance-funded domestic flood reinstatements for a number of 
reasons.  Firstly, the only part of reinstatement that was profitable, he said, was the strip-
out. Secondly, the bureaucracy, negotiation, “hassle” and poor communication that 
characterised domestic reinstatement processes made for very slender profit margins, so 
he only did this where he had a pre-existing relationship of trust with the policyholder and 
wanted to help them get back into their home more quickly. Even then, he hesitated to 
suggest resilient repair to householders if insurers were not going to fund it, for to do so 
would be to give the householders ammunition with which to later criticism him. 
Case Study 2 
Dave had installed some home-made protection measures after a previous flood; he and 
his wife Trish were proud of their flood plan and efforts to keep water away from the 
house. Despite this, they were unable to move back into their terraced house until a year 
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after the most recent flood. This study included interviews with the drying contractor, the 
surveyor, and Dave and Trish themselves.  
 
  
Figure 5 – interviews conducted for Case Study 2 – a householder case study 
Dave and Trish commissioned an acquaintance to do the strip-out so that they could ask 
him to do other work that could be done more cheaply and conveniently alongside the 
insurance-funded reinstatement. The strip-out work had already been done when the 
surveyor arrived at the property ten days after the flood. The surveyor said that he would 
have asked for less strip-out than had been done: the timbers, skirting boards and 
architraves, but not the plaster, which he would have tried drying in situ. Describing drying 
contractors as “so-called experts”, he argued that they tend to recommend more strip-out 
than necessary. In contrast, the drying contractor felt surveyors were less expert on such 
matters and should accept dryers’ recommendations. 
At first, Dave and Trish intended to use the same local builder for the reinstatement as 
they had for the strip-out. However, the loss adjuster felt that this builder did not have 
sufficient capacity to do the work, and Dave and Trish were concerned about damaging 
their social relationship with this builder in the event of a dispute arising. For these 
reasons, they were persuaded to use the builder recommended by the insurer. 
Dave and Trish made good use of the surveyor to sound out his ideas for improving the 
property’s resilience and for advice on what to apply for with the local authority grant. Dave 
and Trish reported that he had considered paying extra for a flood resilient kitchen but had 
decided it wasn’t necessary. The surveyor intimated that he didn’t recommend using the 
grant to buy a resilient kitchen because it would not be possible to install it within the 
anticipated length of reinstatement works. Insurance companies, he said, are reluctant to 
close claims on homes that do not have fully functioning kitchens because problems can 
result if the builders doing the main reinstatement on the insurer’s behalf choose the 
locations of service entry points (e.g. electrical wiring, plumbing) before knowing which 
kitchen layout is going to be used. When kitchens are subsequently installed by a different 
contractors and the service entry points found to be inconveniently located for the chosen 
kitchen design, this, he said, sometimes led to disputes about who was responsible and 
who should pay for them to be moved.  
The surveyor described drying 
contractors as “so-called 
experts” and said they tend to 
recommend more strip-out than 
is necessary. 
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According to the loss adjuster, Dave and Trish wanted to do as much as they could to 
make his home “watertight” without making it “look industrial”. This indicates that Dave and 
Trish’s first preference was to keep water out of the house. Perhaps because of this focus, 
resistant measures dominated the changes agreed by Dave and Trish. They paid up-front 
for flood gates and non-return airbricks in the hope that a local authority grant would 
eventually refund him the cost (as it indeed did). They followed the surveyor’s advice by 
taking steps to waterproof the under-floor void they added to their insurance money to 
replace the flood damaged carpets with higher-quality, more flood resilient, and more 
costly floorboards. After they agreed to economise on the replacement cost of some 
internal doors, the insurance claim also funded a water-resilient UPVC external door.  
Case Study 3 
The third case study was centred on a business whose listed premises were owned by the 
landlord of several other local at-risk businesses. Interviews were conducted with the 
landlord and the owner of the business, Paul. In the flood, the first time the building had 
flooded in living memory, internal water levels had reached up to five feet. This resulted in 
the business closing for four months and obliged Paul to draw on his personal savings to 
prevent permanent closure.  
 
Figure 6 – Case Study 3 – flooded business 
Paul seemed to be focussed on the need to keep floodwater out even though he felt there 
was no way of waterproofing the building. Another reason he gave for his reluctance to 
consider any other forms of resilience was the need to apply for planning permission, and 
the additional delay this would cause to reopening his business. He reported that the 
landlord had promised to install anti-backflow valves in the sewers but had not done so for 
reasons he was unaware of. The landlord was, he argued, “not particularly bothered” 
about resilience so long as there was no interruption to the rental income.  
The landlord reported that the reinstatement had not justified the involvement of a surveyor 
and that he had employed a general builder to do the drying and reinstatement. No 
resilience measures were introduced because the landlord assumed that these were 
precluded by the building’s listed status and that there would be no recurrence of the flood. 
The landlord reported that he 
had assumed resilience 
measures were precluded by 
the building’s listed status. He 
also said that he had assumed 
there would be no recurrence of 
the flood. 
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The same landlord had introduced numerous resilience measures in another of his 
commercial buildings that had flooded numerous times; some of these were funded by the 
insurer. 
Case Study 4 
The final case study was a social enterprise. Interviews were conducted with Charlene, its 
director, and the architect engaged by the organisation to help it apply for a local authority 
resilience grant. The premises had been flooded several times previously. According to the 
architect, the frequency of flooding meant that people in the area “understand that they 
can’t stop [floodwater from entering their buildings]”. 
 
 
Figure 7 – Case Study 4 – flooded business 
The business had introduced progressively more extensive resilience measures after each 
of the previous floods. Hence, although it was still insured against flooding prior to the 
most recent event, Charlene felt that the organisation would be able to reinstate for less 
than the annual premium for flood cover. On the recommendation of her insurance broker 
she appointed a loss adjuster. The loss adjuster was unable to commit sufficient time to 
their case due to being over-committed, so the additional negotiations slowed things down 
substantially. Charlene took a cash settlement to accelerate the process (which would 
otherwise be held up by further negotiations about costs and specifications) and to make it 
simpler for her organisation to contribute extra funds for resilient reinstatement.  
The organisation also received local authority resilience grants, having asked for 
assistance with their application from an architect with whom it was acquainted. This 
architect reported that despite her completing the grant survey before the insurer’s loss 
adjuster had done his specification of works, the insurance company was unwilling to 
include grant-funded resilience in its reinstatement planning. Being in an area that flooded 
frequently, the architect had good relationships with numerous builders that had skills in 
resilient reinstatement and was able to recommend these to Charlene. 
 
 
The architect reported that despite 
the building owner completing the 
grant survey before the insurer’s 
loss adjuster had done his 
specification of works, the 
insurance company was unwilling 
to include grant-funded resilience 
in its reinstatement planning. 
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3.2.2 Communicating with policyholders about resilience 
We now move on to a discussion of each of the key themes that were identified in the full 
set of interviews, beginning with the theme of communication with policyholders.  
Effective communication of messages about resilient repair was found to be a challenge 
due to the emotional turbulence caused to policyholders by flooding and its aftermath. 
Timing and tact were said to be vital in this regard. One surveyor felt that the best 
approach was to “drip-feed” information about resilience in preparation for policyholders’ 
decisions and to ensure they receive this information when they need it and are most 
receptive. 
Trust between message giver and message recipient was also an important influence on 
the effectiveness of communication about resilience. This was affected by a number of 
factors. Policyholders tended to assume that rather than representing the policyholders’ 
interests, surveyors’ and loss adjusters’ principle aim was to minimise the size of 
insurance claims. In addition, they were more likely to trust professionals who were local 
because they assumed they would better understand local circumstances, better 
understand the social and emotional impacts of the flooding and be more sympathetic. 
Hence, when additional professionals were brought from unaffected areas to assist with 
recovery from large incidents, it was harder for them to win trust. Professionals were also 
more likely to be trusted if they provided more tangible services (e.g. stabilising 
companies) or were more able to empathise with policyholders because they themselves 
had experience of flooding. Frequent face-to-face contact with policyholders also 
generated trust, so loss adjusters who stayed with a particular case from beginning to end 
were sometimes more trusted than surveyors.  
The communication of information about resilience was, in addition, affected by the extent 
of professionals’ own motivation to promote resilience to householders. Some hesitated to 
press the case for resilience if policyholders expressed initial reluctance, lest this was 
considered inconsistent with insurance companies’ requirements for them to be client-led. 
Some were also concerned that the adoption of what one called a “sales posture” might 
actually reduce policyholder trust, and that it might not be wise to raise policyholders’ 
hopes about resilience when it was unlikely insurance companies would fund it. Others, 
however, were highly motivated in their promotion of resilience. A builder and an insurance 
broker felt it was incumbent on them to promote resilience: for reasons of professional 
ethics, but also because they felt it would increase customer loyalty if they demonstrated 
their concern for the long-term interests of property owners.  
Policyholders’ attitudes also influenced how receptive they were to messages about 
resilience. One builder reported that householders with experience of multiple floods 
needed no convincing about the need for resilience and, indeed, drove forward the 
resilience agenda themselves. One insurance broker reported that his commercial clients 
were easily convinced to pay for resilient reinstatement when he told them that flood 
 35 
 
insurance might not be available to them in future. In contrast, policyholders were less 
amenable to the resilience message if:  
 the desire to manage the physical impacts of future floods was overshadowed by a 
desire to manage more short-term emotional impacts (see Harries 2008); 
 they did not feel ‘listened to’ by professionals involved in the reinstatement process; 
 they felt their own attempts at dealing with the risk had not been valued by 
professionals; 
 they experienced the reinstatement process as particularly stressful and were afraid 
that a focus on future resilience would exacerbate this effect by making the process 
still more complex.  
3.2.3 Small building companies 
Contrary to what is sometimes argued (for example by professionals interviewed during 
the Quick Scoping Review), the ‘360-style’ interviews suggested that some small building 
companies have the necessary skills for resilient reinstatement. Interviewees in one area 
reported that the frequency of recent flooding had made it worthwhile for local 
professionals (such as builders) to acquire the necessary skills to offer resilience services. 
Additionally, by dint of their personal connections with people who had flooded, and their 
connections with the community more generally, local builders were also sometimes 
considered to have more of the necessary emotional insights.  
However, the small builders interviewed for this research expressed little enthusiasm for 
post-flood reinstatement jobs that involved liaison with insurers and their agents. They 
gave two reasons for this reluctance. The first reason given was the time and effort 
required to negotiate with loss adjusters. The second was insurance companies’ 
reluctance/inability to fund resilient reinstatement, which they felt made post-flood work 
unsatisfactory and potentially unethical.  
3.2.4 Cash settlements 
Cash settlements were considered by those that had received them to have some 
advantages regarding the implementation of resilience measures. Recipients of cash 
settlements reported increased flexibility in the way they allocated their insurance 
payments and, hence, an ability to fund resilience in some areas by reducing the quality 
and cost of reinstatement in other areas. Cash settlements also made it possible for 
policyholders to use their own money to fund additional resilience without this causing 
difficulties for loss adjusters. Work funded by cash settlements had the further advantage 
of reducing the bureaucracy faced by building contractors, thereby making the work more 
attractive to small builders (including those that specialised in resilient reinstatement). 
 
3.2.5 Differences between small/micro-businesses and households 
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The interviews highlighted several differences between policyholders that were 
small/micro-businesses and those that were households. First, they indicated that 
businesses were motivated to implement resilience by an awareness that they might not 
be able to get any insurance cover for future flood events. Second, they suggested that 
flooded businesses tend to have more regular contact with their insurers/their insurers’ 
representatives than householders do. Third, they suggested that businesses are more 
willing to use their own financial resources to pay for resilience measures. 
3.2.6 Summary and suggestions arising from the Case Study 
interviews 
The case study interviews highlight the emotional turbulence experienced by policyholders 
after a flood event. These emotional impacts sometimes overshadow the material aspects 
of flooding, making it harder for them to focus on practical issues such as resilience and 
focussing their attention on the re-establishment of a state of emotional normality (see 
Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). The timing, content and delivery mode of communications 
about resilience need to take this into account, our analysis suggests. Clarity of 
communication will of course remain important. However, communications will also need 
to convey empathy. Furthermore, their delivery would ideally be timed/staged so that it 
was in-step with policyholders’ emotional journeys and they were able to assimilate 
messages. This requires particular skills of the professionals who formulate and deliver 
such communications. Professionals were aware that they might not have these skills in 
sufficient quantity and therefore sometimes hesitated to suggest resilience. In fact, 
policyholders’ preferences for professionals with some experience of flooding (either 
directly, or from living in flooded areas) was in part a response to this issue.  
The interviews illustrated that an important factor in the effectiveness of communication is 
the degree of recipients’ trust in the message sender. The interviews indicated a sense of 
solidarity with other affected people that served to exclude those not impacted by that, or a 
similar, event. Hence, outsiders were sometimes treated with particular suspicion and 
could sometimes be seen as ‘in hock’ to insurance providers and unable to represent the 
interests of policyholders. This, we conclude, also helps explain some policyholders’ 
preference for local builders and local advisers. This suggests that professionals 
(particularly those from outside the affected area) need to win the trust of flooded people, 
and cannot assume that their professional status will automatically cause them to be 
trusted. 
Given the distrust and emotional context just described, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
professionals are sometimes a little reluctant to promote flood resilience during the 
reinstatement process. Our analysis of the case study interviews indicates that 
professionals sometimes hesitate to suggest resilience measures because of the risks 
they believe this entails for themselves. When policyholders themselves are not already 
engaged in the resilience discourse, professionals might feel they would be failing in their 
duty to be client-led if they promoted resilience. Persuasion on the issue of resilience, 
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some felt, would threaten their ability to build trust with policyholders regarding the 
reinstatement more generally. Furthermore, because resilience is generally associated 
with betterment, some professionals assume that insurers are unlikely to support most 
forms of resilience and are wary of raising false hopes amongst policyholders. This 
suggests that professionals will need better guidance and reassurance from insurers if 
insurers want them to take a more pro-active role in encouraging resilience. 
A final overarching factor emerging from the case study interviews concerns the desire to 
avoid extending the reinstatement period. Both professionals and policyholders expressed 
frustration with the length of time it took to conclude reinstatement processes. Likewise, 
both professionals and policyholders sometimes felt that attempts to introduce resilience 
measures would make the reinstatement process more fraught and delay its conclusion 
still further. For building contractors, this was seen as reducing profit margins to the point 
at which contracts became commercially untenable; for some policyholders, it was seen as 
extending the period of disruption for the sake of long-term benefits that might never be 
realised. 
The data from the case study interviews suggest that the use of cash settlements can 
overcome some of the difficulties just described. Cash settlements reduce the number of 
actors involved in making decisions about reinstatement. This creates a relational climate 
more conducive to consideration of resilience, and can reduce anxiety about the creation 
of additional delays. Cash settlements also reduce the administrative burden for property 
owners who are able to fund resilience by topping up insurance payments with their own 
money or providing resilient betterment by diverting insurance money from one part of the 
reinstatement to another. These arguments appeared to be particularly pertinent amongst 
small/micro-businesses, where the prospect of the withdrawal of flood insurance acted as 
a clear incentive for resilience. 
3.3 Findings from the Facilitated Group Discussions  
The Facilitated Group Discussions were carried out to validate some of the findings from 
the other two data collection methods (Quick Scoping Review and case studies). The key 
research question these discussions addressed was RQ4:  
What approaches could be taken to make the implementation of resilient measures 
more effective in the recovery process following flooding incidents? 
Results are presented under the four activities carried out in each Facilitated Group 
Discussion (see section 2.3 for details).   
3.3.1 Activity 1 – response to case studies 
From this a number of key issues emerged that relate to the research question. 
Issue 1 - Improve communications between the different actors and clarity on 
who owns the process 
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To improve communications suggested approaches included co-ordination and an 
understanding of each actor’s roles in the reinstatement process to enable householders’ 
understanding and acceptance of resilience. Participants argued that resilience should be 
on the agenda of all actors. The lack of ownership for resilience across the supply chain 
was discussed by groups in Facilitated Group Discussions 2 and 3, with professionals 
arguing that the ‘responsibility’ of resilience should be shared by all actors within the 
reinstatement supply chain, although it should ultimately be driven by insurers and 
introduced by loss adjusters. 
Participants in Facilitated Group Discussion 1 reflected that the surveyor was needed to 
be involved much earlier on in the process to improve communications. 
Issue 2 - Reduce the uncertainty relating to time leading to anything extra e.g. 
resilient repair being seen as increasing time and therefore to be avoided. 
Participants emphasised the need to communicate the true length of time needed to 
reinstate a property at the outset, to manage homeowner expectations and enable them to 
plan. One of the two groups in Facilitated Group Discussion 3 went further and felt that 
resilience should be introduced in “peacetime”, at the point at which insurance policy is 
taken out, so that citizens have a pre-emptive understanding of resilience measures and 
how they can play a part of the reinstatement process. However, the opportune moment 
was also felt to vary on a case by case basis, and if homeowners had ‘Flood Re’ insurance 
or not. 
Issue 3 - Increase skills in resilient repair  
Groups said that appropriately qualified actors need to be used in a more streamlined 
process, where there are synergies between actors rather than conflict. One participant 
also felt there is a need to encourage local expertise, rather than promoting resilient 
products, which may be a more straightforward part of understanding resilient repair. One 
group reported that some insurers have modified their policy to allow for local builders to 
be involved in the process.  
Groups also suggested instigating a resilience qualification and providing training materials 
of case study experiences for brokers. The creation of an advice line that surveyors can 
use was also proposed. An independent source providing advocacy and a steer on 
resilience could also support the process.   
Issue 4 - Reduce the ambiguity as to what resilient repair is  
All participants called for a flood resilient repair standard, which could for example be 
deployed for all buildings in a high flood-risk area (i.e. for all reinstatement opportunities – 
not just after flooding), and also on the agenda at the point of property sell. Groups in 
Facilitated Group Discussions 2 and 3 suggested that a consistent and reliable 
standard in industry for resilience could alleviate a current lack of understanding and 
responsibility within the supply chain. 
3.3.2 Activity 2 - The repair process and actors involved  
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The second activity involved a presentation of the process diagrams elaborating on what 
they represented. Participants then asked questions and reflected on where might there be 
the opportunities to enhance resilience within the process diagram? A number of 
suggestions emerged from this: 
1) Have wide ranging disaster recovery plans and maintenance plans as a first step to 
the repair process 
2) First stage of the repair process critical to integrating resilience, introduce as early 
as possible in the strip-out and drying stage 
3) Key to arrange processes with key actors early on 
4) Include consideration of resilient repair when the insurance policy is being taken 
out. 
There were, however, a number of key barriers to implementation of resilient repair 
options, as well as potential facilitators. 
3.3.3 Activity 3 - Themes for improvement 
The third activity involved a presentation of the themes for improvement that had emerged 
from the earlier research process, as follows: 
1. Build trust between actors (between different professionals, and also 
between professionals and policyholders) 
2. Increase communication 
3. Normalise resilient reinstatement 
4. Provide funding mechanisms 
5. Streamline delivery of resilience (so that it does not cause delays, and 
reduces the perception of resilience as a costly and time-consuming process) 
6.  Streamlining delivery of the whole process (to make room and ‘emotional 
space’ for resilience, but avoiding sense of haste and confusion) 
7. Allow for emotions 
8.  Build trust in resilience (not only in the policyholder but also in the supply 
chain) 
After the presentation participants were asked for comments and invited to discuss 
whether the themes were as expected. Some of the participants’ comments built upon 
suggested approaches for implementation of resilient measures, and also highlight which 
themes were emphasised during the discussion. These can be summarised as follows: 
1) Improved co-ordination between professionals during ‘peace time’ is needed to 
reduce the recovery gap (the suggestion was this could be led by local authorities); 
2) Incorporation of resilience with building regulations is needed, to ensure sufficient 
guidance, training and skills development of professionals to be able to implement 
resilient repair; 
3) Careful consideration of what could be enacted by default in relation to resilient 
repair, therefore becoming normalised within the recovery process. 
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The discussion was split into two parts, firstly suggested improvements for the whole 
recovery process and secondly discussion of specific improvement for the implementation 
of resilient repair. 
3.3.4 Suggestions for improvement 
In the final task, participants were given a number of the suggestions for improvement that 
had come from the Quick Scoping Review and interview stages. Each of the Facilitated 
Group Discussions were given different suggestions from a number of these themes, as 
appropriate to the participants’ backgrounds. The suggestions made, and the feasibility of 
these, were then categorised by use of a ‘traffic light’ system as shown in Table 4 (for full 
details, see Appendix 4). 
Table 4: Suggestions considered by the Facilitated Group Discussion participants: Green = 
considered feasible or an “easy win”; Yellow = partly feasible; Grey = not considered 
feasible at present.  
Theme Suggestion FGD 
1. Build trust between professionals and 
between professionals and 
policyholders 
Consistent and informed point of contact for 
policyholder and contractors 
1 
Clearer communication of requirements/ 
limitations for resilience from insurers to loss 
adjusters/ supply chain  
2 
Learning and feedback after a major event 3 
2. Increase communication Shared plans and workflow documents 1 
Shared decision making (all professionals 
meeting before drying equipment is delivered 
2 
Use of technology/ shared technology to manage 
claims and improve communication 
3 
3. Normalise resilient reinstatement No-cost changes that don’t change appearance 
to be specified by surveyor 
1 
Set up a “flood agreement” between insurers 
similar to the “subsidence agreement” 
2 
Reinstatement companies offer resilient finishes 
alternatives within each quality/ price band 
3 
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Theme Suggestion FGD 
4. Provide funding mechanisms Provide resilience (as a featured benefits or as an 
extra add on) as a feature on price comparison 
websites to make it visible 
1 2 
Higher premiums to allow for betterment as an 
add on 
3 
5. Streamline delivery of resilience so that 
it does not cause delays and reduces the 
perception of resilience as a costly and 
time consuming process 
Create improved supply chain for resilience 
products 
2 
Local support network of professionals can create 
knowledge in local contracting network 
1 and 3 
6. Streamline delivery of the whole process 
to make room and emotional space for 
resilience (but avoiding sense of haste and 
confusion) 
Streamlining process (even between different 
insurers) in the initial stages of a big event to 
reduce travel time for experts and improve 
standardisation e.g. One surveyor one street 
regardless of insurer 
1 
and 
3 
2 
7. Allow for emotions Allow space and time for emotional adjustment 
and empathy 
3 
Training of professionals in the emotional aspects 2 
8. Build trust in resilience (not only in the 
policyholder but also in the supply chain) 
Information for professionals and more promotion 
of the insurance industry 
3 
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4. Synthesis of findings 
The synthesis of findings across the three sources of evidence is presented in this chapter 
by the themes for improvement. These themes emerged from the Quick Scoping Review 
and case study interviews and were explored further in the Facilitated Group Discussions. 
The themes overlap and some of the barriers and suggestions for improvement address 
more than one theme.  We have reduced the initial eight themes to seven by merging the 
two relating to trust. 
4.1 Build trust 
4.1.1 Between actors  
Trust is important between policyholder and professionals and also between professionals.  
The case study interviews revealed both the importance of developing trust, and a diverse 
range of trust factors that may influence the engagement of policyholders with any 
discussions about resilience. Policyholders sometimes perceive that surveyors and loss 
adjusters are acting in the interests of insurers to reduce the cost of claims rather than to 
help them. A continuous involvement can build trust over time and those that are 
contributing (well) to on-site improvements are seen as trustworthy. There is also 
sometimes a tendency to trust local people over experts brought in from other locations. 
Those with the best expertise and oversight to recommend a holistic strategy for resilient 
reinstatement, managing from a distance, may therefore be least trusted. 
The Quick Scoping Review and the case study interviews revealed there may be a lack of 
trust between professionals and insurers and between different professionals working on a 
claim. Competitive pressures, and avoidance of blame (and therefore liability) can lead to 
silo thinking and lack of respect for each other’s professional judgements. In regard to 
insurers some builders reported that they were deterred from engaging in post-flood 
reinstatement by their lack of trust in the good faith of insurance companies.  
Suggestions for building trust between actors that found resonance with Facilitated Group 
Discussion respondents were:  
 to ensure clear and consistent communication of insurers’ requirements, 
expectations and limitations to their professional and contractor networks; 
 to provide consistent and well informed points of contact and negotiation for 
policyholders (or their representatives) and contractors.   
A further suggestion to build trust through transparent feedback activities after an event 
was seen as potentially valuable, but there were concerns about the best format for 
feedback activities, the best timing (given the length of recovery varies greatly) and the 
means of resourcing such activities.  
 
 43 
 
4.1.2 In resilience 
The Quick Scoping Review revealed that there is a lack of trust in the minds of some 
policyholders and some professionals about which recoverable measures will deliver 
desired outcomes. In part this may due to the lack of evidence and experience. While 
there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that recoverable measures can prevent loss and 
damage and desk studies predicting the expected loss and damage prevention, there is 
yet to be a study that systematically evaluates the actual loss and damage prevention over 
a statistical sample. Another factor regarding trust in resilience is the different goals that 
are held by stakeholders with regard to a successful recovery and future risk reduction.   
The Quick Scoping Review suggested policyholders are perceived to be most interested in 
processes that ensure reoccupation, good aesthetics, keeping water out and the ability to 
reinsure. Professionals may be more interested in lowering cost, speed of handling the 
current claim and customer satisfaction. Quality and resilience are not benchmarks that 
are much discussed in the literature or recognised by professionals interviewed. 
Therefore there is a need to build trust in resilience not only by the policyholder, but also in 
the supply chain. It was suggested that, to increase take up, the insurance industry could 
promote trust by providing information to policyholders and professionals. This suggestion 
was supported in the Facilitated Group Discussions where it was felt there was not enough 
information readily available demonstrating the benefits of resilience. 
4.2 Normalise resilient reinstatement 
Normalising resilience (making resilient reinstatement the normal expectation rather than 
being seen as strange and potentially disruptive) was proposed by the Quick Scoping 
Review findings as a strategy to increase customer demand and provide incentives for 
streamlining and upskilling professionals within in supply chains. The Facilitated Group 
Discussions endorsed the concept of normalisation as critical to the increased 
engagement of professionals with the necessary training and skills development. 
Normalisation would also help to make the application of resilient reinstatement more 
consistent across locations and between events. 
The Facilitated Group Discussions also highlighted that normalisation could involve 
multiple strategies including some changes in building regulations and other industry 
initiatives to consider making some resilient measures an industry default in areas at risk. 
The Quick Scoping Review suggested that resilient reinstatement is an emerging concept 
already gaining some acceptance in the industry both in the sense of reducing strip-out 
(leaving resilient materials in place, ‘sometimes called resilient’ or ‘soft’ strip-out) and 
resilient repair (replacing stripped out materials with more recoverable ones and 
introducing avoidance strategies). 
Three suggestions for normalisation were explored by the Facilitated Group Discussions, 
as follows: 
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1. There was consensus on the suggestion that suitable measures that incur no extra 
cost and do not change the appearance could be specified by a surveyor as a 
default in risk areas.  
 
2. Measures that change appearance would require more consultation with the 
policyholder and this was suggested to be simplified by a standardised set of 
choices tailored to the quality/cost band of the original fixtures and fittings. 
 
3. A “resilience checkmark” or even a “traffic light” system could be developed for the 
purpose.  Facilitated Group Discussion participants questioned whether the resilient 
finish could be specified with the policyholder having the option to opt-out. This is 
particularly important as a particular resilient material may not be suitable in all 
cases.  
The suggestion to create a ’flood agreement’ that created the expectation of resilient 
reinstatement, “similar to the subsidence agreement”7, was questioned on a technical note 
as the subsidence agreement relates to the long term nature of damage from subsidence. 
However, Facilitated Group Discussion participants were open to the thought of an 
industry wide agreement that created reciprocal expectations on insurers to take actions 
that could be demonstrated to reduce the total claims burden on the industry and be 
equitable and affordable in the short term. Government, the ABI or Flood Re were seen as 
potential facilitators of such an agreement. However, literature has noted that this benefits 
new companies that enter into the insurance market because claims are dealt with by the 
existing insurers, new insurers in the market have no legacy of previous claimants while 
benefitting from the betterment spend of other insurers. 
4.3 Streamline delivery 
4.3.1 Of the general reinstatement process 
The Quick Scoping Review highlighted the complexity of the reinstatement process and 
that there are multiple models of claims management with low levels of standardisation 
(Lamond et al., 2017). The required on-site physical processes, assessments, decisions 
and project management tasks may be accomplished by a bewildering range of 
professionals, and the timing and sequence may vary. After a major flood event these 
issues are exacerbated by the shortage of suitably experienced professionals and the 
need to ensure all policyholders are contacted or visited in the shortest possible time.  
The case study interviews and the Quick Scoping Review suggest that this complexity is 
confusing for policyholders and makes it difficult for them to engage with the added burden 
                                            
7 Can be assumed to refer to ABI 2011. Domestic Subsidence/Heave/Landslip "Change of Insurer" Claims Agreement. 
London: ABI. 
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of thinking about resilient reinstatement. This finding was also borne out in the Facilitated 
Group Discussions. 
The Quick Scoping Review also suggested that complexity and accompanying 
fragmentation of the process into distinct phases sometimes led by separate contractors 
(for example, Samwinga, 2009) made it more challenging for professionals to implement 
resilient strategies.  
Suggestions for streamlining the process emerging from the Quick Scoping Review 
included coordinating resources between different insurers in the immediate aftermath of a 
major event to reduce travel time for experts, making more time for assessments and 
discussions about resilience and improving standardisation. This was recognised by 
Facilitated Group Discussion participants as potentially useful in principle, but problematic 
to implement in cases where insurers are managing the reinstatement due to competitive 
factors and competition law. Further investigation of this possibility is needed. A role for 
the local authority was suggested in coordinating and highlighting local resources to those 
managing the recovery for themselves, but it would need to be resourced. 
The review also suggested that in order to maximise the potential for resilient 
reinstatement, project management and oversight should be provided by the same person 
or team across the three central phases of cleaning and strip-out, drying and repair and 
that this team/person should have appropriate knowledge and experience of resilient 
reinstatement.  
4.3.2  Of resilience 
The Quick Scoping Review found that choices about retaining or enhancing resilience 
during recovery are made at several points during the reinstatement process. While the 
repair schedule is key to resilient repair, the decision to retain existing resilience is made 
during strip-out and drying. The Facilitated Group Discussions concurred with the need to 
consider resilience early on in the process and suggested a recovery plan incorporating 
resilience should be in place in advance of flooding.  
The Quick Scoping Review also highlighted differences of opinion on the average impact 
of these decisions on the duration of an ongoing claim, both in terms of the effectiveness 
of drying in-situ and on the supply chain and other factors that might lengthen repair times. 
A case by case assessment is needed to select an appropriate strategy taking into 
account the reduction of future loss against the loss and disruption experienced during the 
ongoing claim. The possibility of delay can be seen as a major barrier by policyholders, 
professionals, and insurers.  
It was suggested that any innovations that made resilient reinstatement cheaper, easier or 
quicker to implement would reduce delays and also the perception of resilience as a costly 
and time consuming process. An improved supply chain for any specialised resilience 
products could form part of this strategy. Facilitated group discussion participants 
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supported this suggestion in general, however it is not clear how this suggestion may be 
implemented. Improved local knowledge and local support networks of professionals and 
tradespersons expert in resilience was seen as a partial solution that is applicable in areas 
that flood regularly.  
4.4 Improve Communications  
Case study interviews highlighted the challenges involved in appropriate communication of 
messages about resilient repair to policyholders. There is a need to consider the best 
timing and at all times to employ tact and sensitivity. The concept of “drip-feeding” as and 
when people need it and are receptive to it was a strategy that was perceived as 
appropriate by some professionals.  
Furthermore, the case study interviews highlighted that it is important for the professionals 
to listen to the policyholder, address their priorities and concerns and respect their points 
of view. Policyholders differ in their attitudes to resilience and some will instigate the 
dialogue on resilience directly while others may express goals related to reduced loss and 
damage. Some policyholders may be focussed entirely on getting back in to their home or 
business in the shortest possible time and exactly as it was before.  
The ‘drip-feeding’ approach does, however, imply an increase in the number of 
communications about resilience throughout the recovery process. However, the Quick 
Scoping Review found that multiple messages can be confusing if they are not consistent, 
hence, communications between professionals and the insurance company must offer 
coherent advice and guidance to the policyholder. 
Given the need to start discussions as early as possible, it is important that the first 
professionals on the scene are able to make judgements and feed back to others or 
access information about any resilience discussions already ongoing. 
Suggestions to improve communication include the provision of shared plans and workflow 
documents. This was seen as basic good practice by the Facilitated Group Discussions. 
While some interviewees and Facilitated Group Discussion participants suggested shared 
plans are already commonplace, others gave examples where this was not the case and 
also indicated that the plans were not in place early enough. Alternative suggestions such 
as meetings between professionals were seen as desirable but impractical in the early 
response after a major flood. The use of technology to improve management of 
communications was also seen as a partial solution. Facilitated Group Discussion 
participants felt that this might help some policyholders, but be unsuitable for others.  To 
some extent this is already happening between professionals, insurers and contractors.  
4.5 Allow for Emotions 
The case studies and the Quick Scoping Review confirm that experiencing flooding is 
traumatic, and that the recovery period causes further stress and anxiety for flooded 
households and businesses. Decision making in these circumstances is challenging and 
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individuals may have powerful emotional responses to any suggestions of change. They 
may feel threatened by being asked to consider resilience.  
It is important to consider the perspective of professionals who are required to deal on a 
day to day basis with individuals (in households and businesses) who are highly emotional 
and may react very strongly to situations. In this atmosphere, professionals may feel 
overwhelmed. Great sensitivity is needed and professionals will need to make judgements 
on how best to introduce conversations about resilience. According to the case studies 
some professionals hesitated to press the case for resilience, for fear of raising negative 
emotions that might further distress the customer and thereby destroy trust. Emotions 
holding back professionals also included a concern about professional integrity in 
promoting adaptations that policyholders do not trust and that they feel are unproven. They 
can also be uncomfortable being an advocate against the policyholders’ wishes. 
Conversely, others felt professional pride that they were acting in the best interest of 
policyholders and frustration when they were not able to deliver, due to insurers’ limitations 
of cover.  
Suggestions for improvement from the Facilitated Group Discussions were to make time 
within a claim to allow for emotional adjustment and for professionals to display empathy 
for the emotions of the policyholders. This could be supported by targeted training of 
professionals using materials that demonstrate the customer perspective.  
4.6 Provide Funding Mechanisms 
The Quick Scoping Review and the ‘360-style’ case studies revealed that, in many cases, 
some resilient measures can be implemented at no extra cost (Lamond et al., 2017). 
However where extra funding is required, the research suggests that simple and 
accessible sources of funding are preferred. In most cases insurers will not pay for 
betterment.   There now appears to be a growing awareness of the benefits of resilient 
repair in the industry as a whole, which has led to some insurers relaxing the policy of ‘no 
betterment’. 
From the case study interviews cash settlements were reported as advantageous because 
experienced contractors could implement recoverable measures without lengthy 
negotiations and interactions with insurers. Funds could be used more flexibly and 
policyholders would be able to add to the resources available without administrative 
difficulties. Businesses were seen as more likely to be willing to invest their own money.  
Grant funding is sometimes available but this is intermittent, and only at governmental 
discretion thus far. Instead, policyholders may take out loans or use charitable donations. 
Enhanced packages are available for higher net worth customers that improve customer 
outcomes and can include resilience.  
It was suggested that insurers could use their premium setting to allow for resilient 
reinstatement either as an add-on (at extra cost) or as a standard feature (at no extra cost) 
that differentiated them from the market. Furthermore, the feature could be made more 
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transparent by inclusion on price comparison websites. Participants in the Facilitated 
Group Discussions were mixed in their assessment of these options. They felt that most 
customers would not be willing to pay the extra, either as top up or more expensive basic 
policy. However, there was support for the concept of policies that could include 
recoverability for a minority of customers. Marketing of such products should include the 
broker community. 
4.7 Increase Knowledge and Awareness 
The Quick Scoping Review and case studies indicated that the knowledge of companies 
and individuals involved in reinstatement has a great impact on the likelihood of measures 
being installed. The case studies suggested that this can sometimes be handled by local 
specialised contractors in areas of frequent flooding. Conversely, the Quick Scoping 
Review suggested that the insurance managed route was more likely to bring in expertise 
from experienced damage management companies.  
It was suggested that more training should be provided to insurers and organisations 
within the supply chain but the Quick Scoping Review highlighted the barrier entailed is the 
investment required (both in time and money) to embed expertise into a company. This will 
be more justifiable if there is a clear impetus towards standardisation of resilient 
reinstatement and demand from the insurers to implement resilience.  
The Quick Scoping Review also brought suggestions that multiple agencies, such as 
government and the ABI, should provide detailed and credible information on resilience.  
 
4.8 Limitations of the study 
Like all research studies, this project suffers from some limitations. One of these is very 
common in research involving businesses and professionals: i.e. the limited number and 
range of people recruited for the interviews and stakeholder groups.   
In the Quick Scoping Review, although representatives from all target groups were 
interviewed these were not representative enough to ensure full coverage of all different 
models of reinstatement. This limitation was offset through the systematic identification of 
previous research studies that address the research questions. There was, however, 
limited coverage of some sub-questions, hence the findings may not be equally applicable 
to all modes of delivery.  
In the second phase of the research, the sample was limited by the choice of some people 
to withhold permission to interview professionals involved in reinstating their properties. 
Some professionals also declined to be interviewed (of those approached for the case-
studies, about one in ten professionals agreed). It is possible that there is a bias in the 
sample to those more favourable to the notion of resilient repair. Certainly the two builders 
that took part were both keen proponents of resilient repair. There was a low response to 
invitations for loss adjuster interviews that may partially be due to the reported (by other 
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participants) frequent changes in the loss adjuster allocated to any particular case. 
Suspicion of the motives behind the approach for an interview may also be a factor, as 
owners of flooded properties frequently reported being in dispute with professionals. The 
reluctance of professionals to participate limited the building of case-studies gathering the 
perspectives and experiences of all or most of the participating actors.  
Collecting data from flooded businesses was also a severe challenge. Many of those 
approached for interviews reported that they had only been inconvenienced by flooding 
and had not experienced substantial damage, while others had not been involved in the 
reinstatement because they had left it to the property owners. There was more success 
with the use of ‘snowballing’ recruitment techniques, gaining access to local networks and 
then approaching businesses recommended by the initial contact and, then, by each 
successive interviewee. This method may, however, have excluded those businesses not 
networked with those active in the area of flood risk management.  
The recommendations made in this report were prompted by analysis of the data 
collected, but the methodology used did not allow for deep probing into the likely 
effectiveness of these solutions. The Quick Scoping Review method is not designed to 
evaluate the strength of evidence underlying suggestions, or to judge the appropriateness 
of suggestions. The ‘ground-truthing’ afforded by the Facilitated Group Discussions helped 
to ensure that a subset of the most directly actionable suggestions were considered by 
representatives of the industry and helped to add important refinements; however, it would 
have taken a more protracted and in-depth consultation and analysis process to evaluate 
the full list of suggestions.  
The contribution of the stakeholder ‘ground-truthing’ Facilitated Group Discussions was an 
essential and significant aspect of this project. The discussions were, however, relatively 
short considering their ambitious aims. There were limits to the participation that may have 
resulted in gaps in the knowledge of those attending including expertise in small business 
insurance and damage management. 
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5. Conclusions and suggestions for 
action 
The conclusions below are largely aimed at a reinstatement process that is managed by 
the insurer or their nominees on behalf of the policyholder – as implied by the term 
“standard recovery process”. Some claims, however, are managed by policyholders or 
their own nominees by means of cash settlements and conclusions with regard to the use 
of cash settlements are included in 5.1.  
5.1 Ways to make the standard recovery process more inclusive 
of resilient measures during the recovery process following a 
major flooding incident. 
The standard recovery process is fraught with challenges. This is especially the case after 
a major incident due to the shortage of specific expertise and the need to manage a high 
volume of claims. In that context the inclusion of resilient measures would be facilitated by 
clear understanding within the professional supply chain regarding the expectations (or 
not) for implementation of resilience. In particular there are currently differences in views 
among professionals regarding:  
 whether neutral cost resilience that has no impact on appearance is automatically to 
be implemented;  
 whether neutral cost options that affect appearance are to be offered, and on what 
basis;  
 what options exist for including extra measures that would normally be classed as 
“betterment”;  
 under what circumstances professionals should evaluate such extra measures on 
behalf of the policyholder;  
 what are the lines of decision-making in case of negotiation in regards to 
implementation of measures.  
Although insurance terms and conditions and the contractual frameworks under which 
professionals usually operate during flood reinstatement could, in principle, define the 
requirements above, they do not always explicitly cover these questions despite intentions 
of insurers to encourage resilient repair. Although, in theory, policyholders can change the 
contractual details, they are constrained in doing so by restrictions to the total claim value 
that are specified by the policy terms and conditions. All other things being equal, more 
resilient measures are likely to be implemented if there are: a clear presumption in these 
documents towards implementation of neutral cost resilience measures; a default 
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evaluation of other options, and a clear route to inclusion of “betterment” when funds are 
available from other sources.  
To increase the presumption in favour of resilience measures, standardisation across the 
industry could be encouraged through external influence: government regulation, for 
example, in combination with industry consensus and understanding of what constitutes 
“betterment” in the context of flood claims, together with adoption of identified best 
practice. There are also general reinstatement standards (BS12999) and guidance (PCA 
Code of Practice) that could be revised in order to include a greater emphasis on resilient 
repair.  
It will also be important for any standards or guidance to recognise that the implementation 
of measures that are recognised as highly resilient sometimes implies the removal of 
other, perhaps less or not so obviously, resilient materials that already exist in a property 
and could be recovered with care. There is a balance to be struck between the retention of 
these existing resilient features and the implementation of new resilient measures.  
In some cases, given the lack of clarity about the requirements of insurers, the payment of 
a cash settlement can increase the likelihood of resilient repair because the authority to 
decide on resilience then rests solely with the policyholder. For those who wish to pursue 
resilient reinstatement, cash settlements can be an effective means to reduce 
administrative challenges provided the policyholder is able to effectively manage the 
project (directly, or through an appointee).  
Evidence from this study suggests that, despite the lack of clarity, some resilient repair is 
being implemented by experienced professionals and encouraged by some insurers. 
Therefore where policyholders are not already predisposed to consider resilient 
reinstatement, cash settlement can, if non-specialists are engaged, reduce the likelihood 
of adoption of appropriate measures. 
To bring more funding into resilient repair there are options to fund ‘betterment’ which 
would facilitate higher-cost measures, where appropriate. These options could include: 
optional add-on premiums; loans and grants that would be automatically triggered by a 
major event; or policyholder savings or business reserve.  
If the revisions were made to encourage resilient repair as part of the standard recovery 
process then there would be a need to upskill professionals in both technical and soft skills 
to meet the new expectations.  
Streamlining the delivery of resilient repair could make resilience during recovery more 
acceptable. Currently, professionals, policyholders and tenants of flooded business 
premises perceive uncertainty in the impact of choosing resilience and see it as a potential 
disruptor to the processing of a claim and the reinstatement. This research identified 
potential delays associated with negotiation with insurers/loss adjusters, confirmation of 
funding routes, choosing and sourcing of specialised materials and trades, and longer 
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construction processes involving cementitious material. Simplified decision processes and 
identification of established routes to source specialised materials and trades can address 
many of these potential delays.  
It is important to stress that the process of resilient reinstatement is set within a general 
reinstatement process that is challenging to deliver during large scale events. This causes 
stress and confusion not only to policyholders, but also to professionals in the supply 
chain. This research did not aim to address all the problems inherent in flood 
reinstatement, but has identified that these problems are sometimes a contributing factor 
to the low uptake of resilience on the part of the policyholder. The research, therefore, 
concludes that simplifications and streamlining in reinstatement generally will enhance the 
uptake of resilience. Improvements necessary to increase the implementation of resilient 
measures will also contribute to the general improvement of reinstatement practice.  
5.2 Ways to improve the delivery of resilient repair to ensure it is 
more easily understood and more consistently accessible to 
householders and small/micro-business across England.  
Acceptance of resilient repair starts with awareness, and, as suggested in 5.1, increase in 
uptake for some resilient measures can be fostered through normalisation and reductions 
in the need for detailed discussions. In other cases, however, this research suggests that 
policyholders need to be able to make choices about resilience and require, therefore, a 
deeper understanding. There needs to be an atmosphere of trust in which conversations 
about resilient reinstatement can be held so that acceptance and understanding can be 
developed. This research suggests that policyholders may relate better to those 
companies and individuals that are in contact most frequently, listen to policyholders and 
are responsive to their situation and deliver tangible, practical assistance.   
This research found that there is a need to increase the amount of communication around 
resilience. The delivery of this communication need not be confined to the reinstatement 
process. For example, it could be part of the insurance discussion from before the start of 
cover and from other agencies from the point of discussions about occupation or property 
transfer.  
The context of the communication, in the aftermath of a flood event, is critically important. 
Insurers and professionals need to recognise the potential for trauma and stress to limit 
the ability of policyholders to make decisions and absorb information. Professionals should 
be sensitive to the individual and their circumstances – including financial and emotional 
attachments, and individual attributes – all of which can influence policyholder capacities 
to consider resilience at different stages in the flood recovery cycle. During reinstatement 
the concept of resilient reinstatement can be introduced early and revisited at key points 
during the delivery, as needed. Messages from those directly involved in the reinstatement 
process may need to be reinforced by other individuals and agencies that are in positions 
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of independence and therefore may be more trusted to act solely in the policyholder’s 
interest (e.g. local authorities, brokers, government). 
Improvement in the quality of such communications is also required. Communication 
around resilience often needs to involve complex technical, and financial information at a 
time of heightened emotions and from different actors if informed decisions are to be 
taken. However, more consistency between the advice and information given by different 
professionals and other stakeholders will avoid confusion and build understanding and 
trust on the part of the policyholder. Professionals need to agree on the presentation of 
strengths and weaknesses of different options (even if this requires some debate between 
the professionals) and to avoid contradictory advice while still allowing different agreed 
options to be considered. Allowing time for policyholders to absorb and decide on 
information on the different options is important. Once informed of options the policyholder 
or their nominated representative (e.g. broker) will benefit from having a single similarly 
informed point of contact during negotiation. Some policyholders may also welcome the 
opportunity to consult with independent sources of advice. 
Clarity in explanation of the options is also important. Where possible options that are 
specific and actionable with clear consequences makes the choice of resilient 
reinstatement more accessible to policyholders. There is currently a lack of the evidence 
and guidance that would enable professionals to articulate the impacts of resilient 
reinstatement. In the absence of evidence or guidance professionals and policyholders will 
sometimes choose the more tried and tested. More evidence that demonstrates the impact 
of resilient reinstatement on claims cost and duration is required. 
5.3 Ways in which government can influence the approaches 
taken by professionals during recovery, to encourage the 
delivery of more resilient repair  
Interviewees stressed that government and associated agencies (such as the Environment 
Agency) and charities (such as the National Flood Forum) have a key role in raising 
general awareness and increasing demand for resilient reinstatement. Government could 
facilitate the development of industry consensus through provision of evidence around the 
impacts of resilient reinstatement and encouragement of the inclusion of resilient 
reinstatement in new standards and guidelines. This would have a direct influence on the 
approaches taken by professionals. 
As noted above, the expectations of insurers (as represented by their terms and conditions 
and contractual frameworks) are a driving influence on the standard recovery process. 
They determine the operating conditions for the professionals and they evolve in response 
to many different influences, including competitive pressures, consumer demand, 
regulatory guidance and imperatives, government incentives and policy, industry agreed 
best practice, as well as positional decisions by individual insurers.  
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Government can influence the approaches of insurers and therefore their professional 
supply chain via the imposition of regulation, and the provision of grants and incentives. 
The regulatory option would mean insurers (and their supply chains) would be obliged to 
implement changes regarding the reinstatement or general refurbishment of existing 
buildings located in areas at risk.  
Government could encourage self-regulation, agreed standards of repair or reciprocal 
agreements within the insurance industry through facilitation, always bearing in mind the 
concerns about competition law and the existence and mandate of Flood Re. 
Government could also offer grants and incentive. This option has already been 
implemented, to some extent, through the provision of grant funding during recovery over 
the last five years. Grants provide funding to policyholders and are a short-term incentive 
to policyholders to put their own resources alongside government grants.  The 
Government Flood Recovery Framework includes the possibility that PFR grants will be 
made available if there was to be a repeat of the scale of flooding experienced in 2016. 
Additionally, government could consider a small grant scheme for resilient repair to assist 
people at flood risk to adapt their properties when non flood repair opportunities arise. 
There is also evidence that through grant funding and exemplar projects some attitudinal 
and practical changes have already begun to emerge amongst insurers and professionals. 
The results of this research indicate that a simple and reliable grant scheme for resilient 
reinstatement would incentivise the industry to increase focus on resilience, although the 
drawbacks identified in the process of administering the grant would need to be addressed 
in future schemes. However, in the longer term, the provision of grants could discourage 
policyholders from taking responsibility for resilience themselves.   
5.4 Suggestions for insurers wishing to encourage resilient repair 
Insurers can encourage cost neutral resilient changes by being clear in their terms and 
conditions that this is the expected normal practice. Such a policy could also include 
consideration of flood resilient repair during all reinstatement work, including that not 
related to flooding. Policy terms and conditions as well as framework and delivery 
contracts can include such an expectation. Terms could give a clear mandate to the 
reinstatement industry to authorise resilient no-cost alternatives without having to first seek 
the approval of the insurance company. This would send a strong signal to the 
reinstatement industry and give them confidence that investing in resilience skills and 
knowledge will be an advantage in gaining and keeping business; this would accelerate 
normalisation.  
Insurers may need to provide detailed information about the expected options to be 
considered by the industry for some types of measures (e.g. building fabric). They might 
also need to promote less specific strategies for other measures (e.g. decorative features) 
that ensure that customers are offered a no cost resilient option whenever one is 
appropriate. 
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Insurers could seek ways to recognise any existing resilience in policyholders’ properties, 
allowing them to set lower premiums in the expectation that resilience will result in lower 
claims. This could encourage more adaptation by providing the incentive of lower 
premiums. This could be through support of any Flood Re initiatives but also for property 
not eligible for Flood Re or not ceded to Flood Re.  
A greater number of insurers could provide innovation in flood insurance products to allow 
for betterment during reinstatement. This could include add-on policy options or wholesale 
increases in premium that allow for betterment. A new industry standard/ statement of 
principles could be discussed that makes some types of betterment for the purposes of 
flood resilience an expectation. These types of betterment would need to be agreed within 
the industry. Publicity for these new products would depend on customer types but could 
include standard marketing, comparison websites, brokers or company agents. 
Insurers can work with others to grow the evidence base on the performance of resilient 
buildings through sharing case studies and data.  
Where community awareness-raising initiatives are taking place during the recovery period 
it would be good for insurers to provide their support. This could be done in a range of 
ways: from giving advice through to sponsoring events. Insurers could work on greater co-
ordination of claims handling during large-scale events so that the available expertise can 
be used effectively and good decisions made at the outset. This could include insurers 
contracting with local businesses for reinstatement work to access locally specific 
expertise on local architecture, soil and water conditions and social contexts who can more 
easily secure the trust of local people and, therefore, more effectively convey messages 
about resilience.   
Insurers could consider their policies relating to cash settlements for claims in the light of 
the potential to impact on resilient reinstatement. It is not possible to generalise in respect 
of whether cash settlements increase uptake; although cash settlements empower some 
individuals, they over-burden others. For insurers wanting to influence uptake directly it is 
most important to recognise that managed reinstatement in the hands of a future upskilled, 
empowered and informed reinstatement industry could result in high levels of resilient 
reinstatement. However insurers that consider resilient reinstatement as betterment and 
not within their mandate to pursue, the offer of a cash settlement for policyholders 
expressing the desire for resilient reinstatement could present an alternative. 
5.5 Suggestions for the insurance supply chain / reinstatement 
professionals 
All parts of the supply chain need to be informed about resilience in order for the 
implementation of resilient reinstatement to be effective. Training of surveyors, loss 
adjusters, contractors and suppliers is required. Ancillary trades and utility suppliers also 
need to be appropriately skilled. 
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It is also important to improve communication within the supply chain to avoid mixed 
messages and ensure plans are carried out properly. This could be through shared work 
documents, CDM documents, written plans or claims management records. Alternatively it 
could be through shared decision making, with professionals holding consultation 
meetings to decide on the reinstatement approach. Enhanced claims management 
technology could also be used.  
The industry could support the provision of more evidence of the performance of resilience 
though case studies and data sharing. Development of rating systems and warranted or 
kitemarked products/procedures would help to build trust.  
Where appropriate a whole community approach can be encouraged where local property 
support networks can be rapidly developed to support the recovery process, e.g. builders’ 
merchants listing resilient products, local general contractors being guided by more 
experienced specialists.  
Contractors and suppliers can work to ensure there is a resilient option available at most 
price points to facilitate no cost changes that improve resilience. The supply time for such 
products should be no longer than standard products. 
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